Bulgaria’s transition over
The country has come a long way in a little time
Interview with: Dr Zhelyu Zhelev, First democratically-elected Bulgarian president

http://www.neurope.eu/articles/81137.php

18 December 2007 - Issue : 760

Dr Zhelyu Zhelev was the first democratically-elected Bulgarian president.

Dr Zhelyu Zhelev was the first democratically-elected Bulgarian president. An emblematic personality of the Bulgarian transition period, dissident and philosopher, Zhelev was persecuted by the Communist regime before 1989 and his book, The Fascism, was officially banned. Dr Zhelev had a mandate and a half as President of Bulgaria, since he was first directly elected to his office by The Great National Assembly, and later he won the first direct presidential elections, held in Bulgaria after the changes in 1989. Dr Zhelev is Chairman of the Balkan Political Club, founded in 2001. He is a member of the Liberal International as well as Chairman of the Dr Zhelyu Zhelev Foundation.

Mr. Zhelev, you said that it was a sheer miracle that SDS still exists. It is probably a comparison with the parties that brought about the changes in the other East European countries. Why did this miracle happen, in your opinion?

This is due to the logic of a number of circumstances, some of which are paradoxical. Among the reasons is the fact that BSP was the last party to change according to the principles of the European socialist parties. This process kept SDS as a necessary opponent in the political space. Our project for SDS was that one day it would disintegrate as a coalition, because it had been founded as a coalition, and it would give birth to the new democratic parties – left, right or centrist ones. These are necessary elements of the multiparty system. That is what happened in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

The age of the blue party, 18 years, coincides with the age of the beginning of the changes in Bulgaria. What does this coming of age mean to SDS – more opportunities, more responsibilities, or a new way?

That actually means that SDS has a big political capital in its history. This capital includes both the successful achievements, and the big mistakes on the way. Every party, as well as every clever person, can learn a lot from this experience. In this sense SDS has a great arsenal which it can use according to the new circumstances, and apply new methods, forms, style of work.

Aren’t the mistakes greater in number anyway?

No, they are not. It is a fact that they exist. They are very serious and almost border with a catastrophe for SDS, but at the same time it can’t be denied that the whole transition period was a programme of the blue party rather than of the BSP. The Socialists wanted to make a Perestroika, while SDS started on the way of the tender revolution, destruction of the old totalitarian system up to its foundations and creation of a new multiparty system from the ruins, and through it, the whole political infrastructure of democracy – with the political pluralism and all political and civil freedoms.

How do you account for the paradox that the party that brought renovation in the country, is currently having such a low social credibility, that it may not get into the next parliament?

If SDS follows the same way as in the past, it has nearly no chances. I hope that the new leadership which consists mainly of young people will overcome this problem. Plamen Yurukov, the current leader of the party, is a man with a modern way of thinking and with the ambition to reconstruct it, not on the basis of the vertical structures in the leadership, but rather by means of extending the horizontal structures. This makes a party more viable, more initiative and gives the possibility to its members to feel like people who can make politics, rather than only salute the leadership.

And when you refer to the past you have in mind the interpersonal conflicts among the prominent people from the party, is that it?

This type of conflicts existed almost right from the start. There were some incorrect strategies in the work of SDS. For instance, the lack of inner democracy. While I was Chairman of the Coordination Council of SDS, the decisions used to be taken with consensus in this coalition of parties. Three representatives of each formation within SDS used to voice their opinion on every issue, and if we did not reach an agreement on some point, we used to put off the decision making for the next session. Meanwhile, sounding out of opinions was being made, things were being considered from all sides, we consulted people outside the leadership about their viewpoints. Nobody ever persecuted anybody for thinking differently. Later, people who orientated the whole coalition too much to the right came – something that did not yet have a solid foundation in Bulgaria, unless it just came out as mere anti-Communism, and this is counterproductive. This fact brought about the first splitting of the SDS, as early as 1991, and in a sense it had been provoked by the 39 members. Due to that fact the coalition was left by Petar Dertliev with his Social Democratic Party, Milan Drenchev with his BZNS Nikola Petkov, Petko Simeonov with the Liberals Party, Alexander Karakachanov with the Green Party, but the parties mentioned were the big formations in SDS. That is the reason why at the parliamentary elections, held on October 13, 1991, SDS gained a lead of 1.22 percent before BSP, which is a minimal difference. That turned round the heads of some people and then they coined the phrase “With a minimal difference but forever.” And this “forever” turned out to be less than one year. This weakness was gradually turned into an ineradicable vice in the ideology, strategy and the inner party policy of SDS. Had it not been for the split, SDS would have had the chance of winning an absolute majority. With the participation of DPS, the coalition could have attained a total majority which could have helped them change even the Constitution and so on.

And then the transition would have been different, is that it?

The reforms and politics would have been different, the confidence of SDS would have been greater, and this would have helped BSP reform itself more rapidly. Such processes occurred in the Democratic, the Radical Democratic Party, the United Democratic Centre. SDS was left by people such as Elka Konstantinova, Stefan Savov, and Stoyan Ganev. This way the positions of SDS were growing weaker, because that was an incorrect political strategy. The reason for this was that the country was getting into the real transition period when serious and extremely unpopular reforms had to be made – returning of the land in real boundaries, restitution, and privatisation. These things had to be done, because they were actually altering the economic basis of society. It is one thing to talk against communism, but it is quite a different thing to do things that would make communism disappear economically – its structure and fundaments too. Then there were cases of ostracising from the party, keeping members in the “freezer,” shelling out members from the party, exorcism, and other political acts of ignorance, which brought SDS as a coalition to a pathetic state. It was Ivan Kostov who turned the coalition into a party.

Wasn’t that the better move for that time then?

It could have remained a coalition, but with its inner democracy. What Kostov did was an alternative too. He turned SDS into a political party. But he made it so monolithic in character and so close to BSP in structure, a vertical structure, strict subordination, the decisions came down from above, there wasn’t any inner party opposition whatsoever. And in every democratic party there are always fractions. They are held together because of the common programme and usually spring up, caused by the differences in opinion on the issue of how to carry out the programme. Some come up with one solution, others with a different one, they are having their arguments about that, and still others take a middle of the road position, that is what causes brains to click into operation in a party. Otherwise the party becomes like a barracks, its members are soldiers that salute and carry out the orders.

In this respect BSP seems to be more advanced because it has its left wing, led by Yanaki Stoilov?

This is true, but the Socialist Party has other problems. They were too slow to give up Communism, its morality and its political practice. It was not by accident that they were forced to accept the NATO and EU accession, the American military bases in Bulgaria. Principally they were not against these things but they sounded rather unreal. And accepting them would already mean another policy and ideology.

Isn’t the offer of Boyko Borissov to sign an agreement for the foundation of a right-wing coalition for ruling the country, submitted only days ago, more or less an attempt for a “deadly clutch” for the old right-wing section?

This offer is like a double-edged knife. What you said is one of the aspects. The other one is GERB itself. They have not been in power, they have not taken any responsibilities yet. Borissov is already being criticised in Suhodol because of the reopening of the depot for wastes. This is the displeasure of the people when no promises have been kept, when they do not have any guarantee. That is the reason why GERB have yet to prove itself. This could be affected with practical steps in politics, not only by stating that they are a right-wing formation.

SDS leader Plamen Yurukov has proclaimed that the new mission of the party is the change in the political system by changing the election system, for which they will be looking for a support from BSP as well. Do you think that it is possible for the ruling left wing party to support ideas of the opposition?

If they still slave to political prejudices, it is only natural that they won’t support it. But if they are led by the national interests they would have to consider such an idea. In fact SDS has many times neglected ideas of the left wing. Mature political parties don’t do this. That would help us find out whether both political powers have already matured.

As ex-president how do you assess the ruling of the triple coalition and the development of Bulgaria?

Before the country was accepted in the EU, it was very important to have a strong executive power which could take decisions and make them a reality. Without this coalition among BSP, NDSV and DPS Bulgaria could have been left out of the European Community.

Why was that, was the situation so fragile?

Who would accept a state in which the political powers cannot form a government? The executive power, apart from doing its routine work, will follow the new policy, will bring the transition period to its completion. President Georgi Parvanov’s position does him a lot of credit, he managed to form this coalition. But the proportion of the political parties with respect to the key political posts could have been different in order to inspire more confidence. For example the prime minister or the chairman of the National Assembly must not be representatives of one and the same political party, but rather of the coalition partners. Then the unity would have been better. They could have made a wider coalition with the participation of the Bulgarian People’s Union of Moser, Sofianski, and Karakachanov. Their condition for participation in the ruling of the country was for the prime minister not to come from BSP. In this way a greater confidence and trust among the coalition partners would have been achieved. It would have been even better if the coalition had been formed for a given term, particularly until Bulgaria’s joining the EU, that is, until January 1, 2007. After that date the issue should have been raised again of how the country was to be ruled, what would be the new social order, would the coalition exist in this form etc. That was the way we formed the government of Dimitar Popov in 1990. Then I raised the issue of having the ruling coalition extended, because the situation in the country was very critical, people were on the streets and squares, which fostered extremist attitudes. There was a danger for the country to follow another scenario which could end with shedding blood, as in the case with former Yugoslavia. That is why we decided that it was the best idea to form a wide coalition with the participation of all parties. But this coalition has strictly defined tasks, set at the round table in the session hall of the presidency. This cabinet would exist for a period of half a year, from December 31, 1990 till June 30, 1991. During this period the government had to carry out the monetary part of the reform, or liberate the prices, which happened very gradually and slowly, like in a textbook. Prices went up five or six times. It was then that the phrase of Dimitar Popov was coined, “For goodness sake, brothers, do not buy!” The second thing that had to take place was to prepare and hold the next parliamentary elections. This did not happen within the terms planned, which prolonged the life of the government, because the parliament could not manage to prepare the documentation, needed for the vote. This is an example of making a wide coalition in which almost all political parties participate.

Does Bulgaria’s joining the EU mark the end of the transition period in this country?

Yes, I think so. Of course there are still many things that have yet to be done, as well as things that have to be improved. However, this is a transition from a totalitarian Communism to democracy and modern, free market economy. These things have already been accomplished, though with all weak points of the economy. The fact is a fact. So we are faced with a new stage and it can even be called a new transition period. However, it will be quite different from the one that is over.