KOSOVO IS NOT JUST A NAME
16-01-2008

 After his election victory on 17 November and an invitation from President Fatmir Seydiu on 11 December to form the next government, Hashim Taji is on his way to the parliament building. He is to be welcomed to rapturous applause from his 37 MPs, alongside the 25 MPs of the Kosovo Democrat Party who supported him, as Kosovo’s prime minister. He is set to make an historic speech declaring Kosovo’s independence. But on his way to parliament, he is targeted in a rocket attack and killed. Also among the dead is the European Union representative Wolfgang Ischinger. The Kosovopress agency announces the assailants are of Serbian origin.

The same day, the EU, NATO and United Nations evaluate these dangerous developments in explosive Kosovo, and comes to a number of decisions. They include recognising Kosovo’s independence, and placing it under EU control and NATO protection. Meanwhile, Serbia and Russia deny the accusations directed to them and announce they will not stand silent against this fait accompli. Serbian troops are put on alert. Russia announces it will aid Serbia in every means..


This scenario is enough to make everyone uneasy, but it unfortunately cannot be listed under “impossible scenarios”. In fact, this or a similar disaster scenario is a desirable option for many centres of power, because from the EU’s perspective the problem in the Balkans has not been resolved.


The eastern problem and Russia


From Europe’s point of view, the Eastern Problem emerged in the 19th century, before two world wars, at a time when globalisation was intense, the race for apportioning between the powers was becoming congested, and liberalism and nationalism had reached a peak.


The Ottoman Empire of the 19th century still had a presence in Europe – in the Balkans – and it was the greatest obstacle in front of the continent’s apportionment. The “sick man of Europe” was weakened by uprisings that were incited in the Balkans, beginning with the Serbs in 1804 and the Greeks in 1820. Russia, tied to the Slavs through national, religious, cultural and historical means, had set its sights on reaching extending its territory to the Mediterranean, and declared itself patron of certain peoples in the Balkans. But Austria and Britain rejected Russia’s involvement in the Balkan split, because Europe did not wish for Moscow to adopt a key role so soon after “liberating” the lands from the Ottomans. There were additional fears that Russian expansion could lead to further dangerous developments between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.


London’s intentions were to secure its routes to India and blockade Russia from the south. There was a similar struggle between Moscow and London over resources in Central Asia.


In 1839, Egypt declared war on the Ottoman Empire and Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria came to an agreement in London on 15 July 1840. In the years that followed, Britain gave aid to the Ottomans, and Egypt remained within Ottoman borders. Britain and France later joined the Ottomans in war in the Crimea.


This was the background to the conflict:


In 1853, Russia abandoned its policy of attempting to form a sphere of influence over a weak Ottoman Empire, which had been involved in the Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa crisis. Russia’s new policy was to destroy the Ottoman state, and it used the problem of the holy lands to reach this aim. The Ottoman Empire had granted certain concessions to Christian Orthodox and Catholics in and around the holy city of Jerusalem. In 1853, Russia clashed with France, as protector of Catholicism, over these concessions. Russia offered to split these lands with Britain but the latter was in favour of Ottoman territorial integrity and refused.


Russia’s next move was unilateral. It offered the Ottomans an alliance and asked to assume the role of protector for all Orthodox Christians within Ottoman borders. Relying on British support, the Ottomans refused, a decision that led to war. But the Crimean War was more about Europe’s political status rather than helping the Ponte. It was important that the international balance in the Balkans was not tipped in Russia’s favour.


Britain and France both though Russia had to be kept out of Europe, and the war achieved this aim. But the Ottoman Empire, despite being victors on paper, suffered great damages in reality. This war of 1853-1856 was followed by another between 1877 and 1878, caused by Russia’s wish to increase its influence over Ottoman Orthodox citizens in the Balkans, and Britain and France’s desire to prevent Russia from gaining strength.


Ethnic conflict in the Balkans had reached a peak. Tensions were high; this was partly because of mounting taxes brought on by foreign debt, but it was also because many Muslim groups, such as the Circassians and Abaza forced from Chechnya by the Russians, were settled in the Balkans.


In the meantime, European pressure for Ottoman reform continued to rise. That pressure led to the Tersane Conference in Istanbul to discuss wider autonomy for the Bulgarians, Serbs and Romanians. In an attempt to soften the decisions of that conference, Abdulhamid II quickly declared the first constitutional era on 23 December 1876, but the conference still delivered very hard decisions against the Ottomans. When Istanbul said it would not recognise it, Russia hardened its stance.

Russia launched war on 24 April 1877 with an invasion of Eflak and Boğdan. The Ottomans were forced on the defensive on two fronts, Tuna and the Caucasus, against a superior Russian army. This war was one of the first important steps in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire.


Extreme debt, a weak economy and mounting ethnic discontent led to even greater reforms being imposed. This “Edict of Reform”, as it came to be known, was intended to satisfy Europe by relaxing borrowing and reducing the possibility of ethnic clashes. But this allowed the state to remain partially upstanding only for another 20 to 30 years.


Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 March 1878. It was a heavy and demand treaty for the Ottomans, establishing the Russians as the sole force in the Balkans. It was a treaty that disturbed the great powers of Europe.


Following European pressure, Russia agreed to revise the treaty and, on 13 July 1878, the Treaty of Berlin was signed between the Ottoman Empire, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and France. Alongside Karlowitz, this was a second deathly blow to Ottoman presence in the Balkans. Compared to San Stefano, Berlin’s only advantage was to delay the Ottoman departure from the Balkans for around 25 years. It was this delay that caused the First and Second Balkan Wars.

The First Balkan War and the treaties at London, Istanbul and Athens were the final steps of departure for an already dwindling Turkish and Ottoman population in the region.


According to certain western sources, the Ottoman Empire suffered around 5.5 million civilian losses between 1921 and 1923.

It is a figure nearly equal to Jewish losses during the Second World War.


Unabating restlessness in the Balkans were one of the causes of the First World War. It was in this region that the war broke out.


On the eve of the war, there was a great struggle for supremacy in the Mediterranean and Balkans. While those powers with shores on the Mediterranean followed policies of hegemony in the area, Russia wanted to expand to the sea. Russia’s urge was also driven by its pan-Slavic principles.


Russia’s support of Serbia was a threat to Austria-Hungary. Serbia was in effect under Russian guidance, and took its place by Russia’s side, against German and Austria-Hungary.


Ottoman had no business left in the Balkans, but as the Eastern Question continued, it took only a spark to trigger conflict between the Russian and European blocs.


Austria put on a show of force to challenge those dreaming of a Greater Serbia. On 28 June 1914 – the day of Saint Vitus when the Serbs had lost wars in Kosovo but Milosh Kablovich had killed Murad Hüdavendigar – Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serb. Germany announced it was at Austria’s side; Russia said it was by Serbia.


Following the First World War, Yugoslavia was established in 1918. It was originally a kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and it added the word “Kingdom” to its official title in 1929. Until Hitler’s invasion in 1941, it kept this name, meaning “Land of the South Slavs”.


The New World Order and the Balkans


The Democratic Yugoslavia Federation was founded following the Second World War in 1945. In 1946, this became the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and, on 7 April 1963, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This name endured until four states – Slovenia, Croatia, the Macedonian Republic and Bosnia-Herzegovina – separated from Yugoslavia in 1992.

That year, Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosovo) joined Montenegro in founding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The name was lifted in 2001 and took on its final form, Serbia-Montenegro, on 4 February 2003.


On 21 May 2006 Montenegro voted with a 55.5 percent majority for its independence. It needed 55 percent for secession from Serbia to occur. On 3 June 2006, the Montenegrin parliament declared independence.


The break-up of Yugoslavia, a country outside of Europe’s hegemony, took place with great humanitarian tragedy. Like in the 19th century, this process involved massacres and genocide. What secured the Balkan fate was the collapse of the USSR and Eastern Bloc. With the end of the Cold War, previously frozen balances gained momentum and “unfinished business” returned to the fore. As the 1990s began with hopes of a new world order, the future in the Balkans was also beginning.


41 years after being split in 1949, Germany reunited in 1990. In the five years that follow this, Germany was headed towards becoming a world power once again. In a manner that was reminiscent of the “Generalplan-Ost” plan to place Poland and Russia under German hegemony in World War, targeted the Balkans.


In July 1994, the German Constitutional Court lifted the block on sending German troops abroad. Three days later, the German navy was sent to the Adriatic. Other missions followed. From Berlin’s perspective, “humanitarian perspective” was important, even if not in Rwanda then certainly in the Balkans.


The widespread understanding in Germany was that, because of the country’s history of catastrophe and fascism in the Balkans during the Second World War, it should not stand without response to the this latest disaster laid in front of Europe’s eyes.


1991 was the year that the ties between the Yugoslav states were broken. The two Catholic states, Slovenia and Croatia were first to declare independence that year. Macedonia followed in September 1991. In February-March 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum over independence, which was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs but still accepted. On 5 April 1992, the Bosnia-Herzegovina government declared its independence. On 6 April, the US and European countries recognised that declaration.


When Serbo-Croat tensions escalated to armed conflict, the US, Britain and France intervened to delay the break-up of Yugoslavia. At the same time, Germany forced European countries to recognise Slovenia and Croatia’s independence because, as German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher said, Berlin was in favour of popular self-determination.

It is likely that they saw Slovenia and Croatia as Germany’s springboard in the Balkans. Neither the Slovenes nor the Croats – unlike the other Balkan peoples – seemed to remember the bad experiences of the Second World War. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl words were “Germany has won a great victory” as European countries recognised Slovenia and Croatia. This was confirmed by the Croatian leader Tudjmann, who shortly afterwards said, `We could not have succeeded without Germany’s support.”


But the problems between Croatia and its Serbian minority mounted in stages between 1991 and 1995, when Croatia began its ethnic cleansing against the Serbs. It was at this time that Croatia rapidly armed itself: there were 17 big deliveries from Germany between 1991 and August 1992.


A report by Raphael Draschtak from the University of Vienna in April 2002 about Yugoslavia’s military phases until the 1995 Dayton Agreement said that, on 4 October 1991, 40,000 uniform and three trailers containing anti-tank weapons were sent from Bielefeld to Zagreb. In January 1992, 5 million marks’ worth of weapons and ammunition, weighing around 17.5 tons, was unloaded at Rijeka Harbour. The equipment sent here included optical targeting machines, night vision systems, walkie-talkies and a substantial amount of ammunition. Three tons of this equipment was rapidly transferred to the 113th Brigade at Sibernik.


Between 10 and 13 April 1992, 60 tanks were handed over to Slovenia’s Koper port and transferred to the Kukuljanovo Base near Rijeka. This transfer is mentioned in Ralph Hartmann’s book, “Truth Commission”, about the effect of Germany’s involvement in the process of war in Yugoslavia.


Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy magazine’s September 1995 issue said that Germany had handed over 27 MiG-21 aircraft and 150 T-55 tanks to Croatia in September and October 1995.


The Belgrade-based Narodna Armija military magazine had written in August 1992 that Croatia had acquired 1,500 Singer rockets, 5,000 Milan-type anti-tank rockets, 62,00 rocket bases and 25,000 guns from Germany and Austria.


30 German soldiers began work at a Zagreb airbase on 10 September 1992. ARD Television’s Monitor programme on 27 February 1997 said that Germany had included ammunitions among the humanitarian aid it sent to Zagreb and Bihac.

In March 1992, Croatia purchased 90 lorries from Germany. There were other deliveries from Hungary and France around the same time. Even the Christian militia in Lebanon sent Croatia weapons and ammunition over Germany.


In parallel to this process, the Bosnian Serbs, unhappy with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence, themselves declared the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) and seceded from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In an attempt to gain as much territory as possible, the Bosnian Serbs then launched – with the support of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and Chief of the General Staff Perisic – a campaign of ethnic cleansing.


The Serbians ruthlessly killed the Bosniacs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina for its Serbianisation target. In spite of world anger, Milosevic continued to give open and covert strategic and military support.


The war lasted from 6 April 1992 until 14 September 1995. According to the International Red Cross, 312,000 people lost their lives and as many as two million people were forced to leave their homes. 200,000 of the dead were Bosniacs.

Towards the end of the war, when the Muslims were victorious on several fronts, the Dayton Peace process emerged and brought the hope of peace. The Serbs saw the war was close to an end, and on the pretext of capturing the strategically important towns of Gorajde and Srebrenica, they launched an attack with all their might. This led to one of the greatest massacres seen in history. It happened as the world watched as an audience.


The Pulitzer Prize winning American journalist David Rohde condemned what happened: “The international community partially disarmed thousands of men, promised them they would be safeguarded and then delivered them to their sworn enemies. Srebrenica was not simply a case of the international community standing by as a far-off atrocity was committed. The actions of the international community encouraged, aided, and emboldened the executioners. … The fall of Srebrenica did not have to happen. There is no need for thousands of skeletons to be strewn across eastern Bosnia. There is no need for thousands of Muslim children to be raised on stories of their fathers, grandfathers, uncles and brothers slaughtered by Serbs.”

In 1994, efforts intensified to end the war. The United Nations, United States and NATO all took action, drawing maps that split Bosnia-Herzegovina down ethnic lines into three and presenting these to all sides. In 1994, NATO aircraft began to enforce a UN no-fly zone, thus eliminating Serbian superiority of the air. In March 1994, the Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats reached agreement. On 21 November 1995, the Dayton Agreement was accepted. It was signed on 14 December 1995, ending the Bosnian war.


Before the War, After the War…


Following the Bosnian War, the scenario looked something like this: the Muslim population, an inheritance from the 19th century, had suffered significant losses and was politically weakened. In the same way, the Russian-back Slavic Orthodox presence had been inflicted a heavy defeat and had lost a lot of blood


In response to this, Serbia formed an alliance with Montenegro and changed the name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to “Serbia and Montenegro” on 4 February 2003, thus forming a new state.


On 21 May 2006, the people of Montenegro called for independence in a referendum, which led to Serbia and Montenegro breaking apart. On 3 June 2006, Montenegro formally became independent of Serbia in a process supported by the European Union. Serbia declared itself the legal and political successor state of Serbia-Montenegro.


But that was not the end of the nightmare for Serbia because Kosovo, which had been “cooking” since 1989, was now ready to be served. The process that began with Milosevic’s lifting of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 found momentum with Albanian assertiveness and the formation of the UCK. When clashes increased, NATO launched strikes against Serbia, and Kosovo entered international control.


The United Nations formed KFOR and UNMIK as its tools in Kosovo for the new process. The OSCE and European Union shared the task of reconstructing Kosovo.


Kosovo from Europe’s point of view


Kosovo will most likely gain its independence under joint EU, US, UN and NATO patronage. But seeing as Belgrade has lost Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro up until now, it – and Russia alongside it – might not tolerate the loss of Kosovo.


Belgrade has previously said that it would not give up on Kosovo at any cost, even a vision of the European Union. Given the increasingly vicious demands in ethnic conflicts around the world, Serbia could reject domestication.


When one thinks that Russia is at one with Serbia, its final stronghold in the Balkans, the European Union might take into account its own stagnating economy and its lack of military ability (which it regards to be a weakness) to reconsider the Kosovo case in a different way. After all, frontiers on the Balkans rarely change peacefully, and economies are constantly invigorated by war, which would make a war concerning Kosovo not impossible.


The European Union’s need for Kosovo


When the EU’s definitive stance in favour of Kosovo’s indepedence is examined, certain arguments should not be overlooked. The Union is always known for its utilitarianism, but it has no need for a Kosovo that would give it further political strength. Kosovo does not have any striking economic contribution, or indeed a strong army or military capability to bring to Europe.

The EU is clearly not an organisation that operates independently of its members’ requests and expectations. Seeing as the attitude of member states towards the Balkan balance of power reflects the EU’s overall policy, it seems clear that such a difficult issue as Kosovo will be resolved according to Western Europe’s interests and, in response, the EU will have some of its own needs met.


The process of “deepening” – that is to say, the EU’s efforts to industrialise and build a new Roman Empire as part of its historical, cultural and political mission – was unsuccessful during the process of ratifying the European Constitution. The developments show that the idea of unity did not have public support, particularly in France and the Netherlands, which both gain much from the Union.


As European Union becomes larger and more disorganised, it is attempting to use the draft constitution crisis to overcome its larger problem of identity. For this, Germany has come up with the idea of the Reform Agreement, to be ratified in member state parliaments without referendum. This agreement is based on the document that changed the Roman Empire from a kingdom to a republic. It might strengthen the Union in shape to ratify without asking the people, but it will not show the EU’s resourcefulness and necessity to the man in the street.


Quite the opposite, it will strengthen the belief that the EU is not beneficial for Europeans, that it is not based on Europeans and is only a mechanism that serves itself and operates through decisions taken behind closed doors.


The reform document, at some 287 pages, with 13 protocols and 65 comments in an attachment, was prepared without consulting parliaments and will have to be ratified without the opportunity for change. It could have the effect of cooling Europeans from the ideals of Europe.


This “practical constitution”, which comes into effect on 1 January 2009, will not make it possible for the Union to produce a truly communal contract. Nor it will allow for a consensus of member nationalities.


The document will allow the European Union to nationalise, institutionalise and be stronger in foreign policy. In this case, any EU action based on documents that appeared without consulting Europeans will be considered the common voice of European Union citizens.


The EU is expected to adopt a more neo-liberal and military outlook. Under articles 17 and 28, the EU will be able to launch military operations, without UN Security Council approval, as part of a collective reflex to protect itself. It will also be responsible for organising and developing the military capability that would carry out this task. It now becomes possible for the European Defence Agency to develop the battle against terrorism (Article 188), while the European Union can also be drawn closer to NATO (Article 27).


This will happen through the relevant and interested member states of the European Security and Defence policy (articles 27 and 31).


The European Union – a “project for peace and civilisation – could therefore soon become an open and near threat for many in the foreseeable future. There are other indications pointing in this direction too.


As part of the “Headline Goal 2010” programme, which was established in June 2004, the German term presidency of January – June 2007 launched a project to create a military force of 40,000 troops to transform the EU into a global military player. The “Helsinki Force Catalogue” of 2000, which set the target for a capacity of 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft and 100 ships, is also underway.


The “Civilian Headline Goal 2008” project, declared in December 2004, was started as the civilian branch of the European Security and Defence policy. It covers the capability to monitor and direct crises.


And the 18-month German-Portuguese-Slovene term presidency programme, declared on 18 October 2006, emphasises that the development of Europe’s military strength and capability was a high priority, parallel to the acceptance of the European Constitution. As part of this process, the EU and NATO could become “strategic partners” in 2008. The rapid response units could be launched as part of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (EU MRRC).


The European Armament Agency has been in operation since 2004 and intends for member states’ defence industries to be developed and their needs met. The European Intervention Force began work on 1 January 2007. There is also a 1.6 billion Euro budget for EU military research in space.


Kosovo might have no contribution to the European Union, be it in terms of constitution or military ability. But Kosovo could be making contributions in the adoption of the constitution and the evaluation of military ability.


The climate of peace in the Balkan peninsula could help the European Union spread the principles and virtues it defends, and intervene against those who oppose human-centred, democratic, lawful points of view. This could create the popular support and economic recovery that the European Union needs.

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